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1 Introduction
Modern Turkey inherited the legacy of a highly centralized governance structure 
from the Ottoman Empire. With the collapse of the empire, the modern Turkish 
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republic emerged as a centralized top-down state with an ambitious modernization 
and economic development project. The roots of this modernization can be found 
in the late Ottoman state reforms that aimed to preserve the disintegrating empire. 
From its establishment in 1923 until the end of the Second World War, highly 
insular and motivated technocrats led the modernizing reforms under single party 
rule in the Turkish Republic.
In the 1950s, the Democrat Party (DP) government attempted to undermine 
the long-established practice of centralized authoritarian rule by opening avenues 
for a new political voice for groups that had traditionally been excluded from the 
country’s power structure. It is debatable to what extent the DP aimed to achieve 
a counterrevolution, but the perception of both the military and the government 
bureaucracy was that the DP presented a threat to the secular centralist regime. 
These fears were further exacerbated by rising economic instability and eventually 
led to a military coup in 1960. This first military coup drew considerable sup-
port from the centralist bureaucracy and intellectuals and aimed to restore secular 
republican ideals and bring about wider democratic rights. The army briefly inter-
vened again in 1970, this time through an ultimatum to the civilian government 
and in 1997 through the state security council. The 1980 military intervention, 
along with its civilian government established in 1983, promoted a new economic 
regime: trade liberalization and export-oriented growth. These military interven-
tions took advantage of weak central coalitions of the political elite and radical-
ized multiparty politics.1 They invariably brought new regime changes along with a 
speedy restoration of military-induced civilian governments.
Throughout its half-century experiment with multiparty politics, Turkish polit-
ical party reforms and parliamentary mandates remained ineffectual in guiding 
economic and social change in the country. Instead, Turkey’s political and eco-
nomic systems were periodically adjusted through undemocratic means, primar-
ily civilian unrest and army interventions. During the postwar period beginning 
in the 1950s, quite contrary to earlier marginalization of the army from political 
power in the 1930s and 1940s, the military gained a central role as the ultimate 
guarantor of stability, secularism, and territorial integrity of Turkey. This central 
role for the military in governance found considerable support among civilian poli-
ticians and intellectuals.i
This chapter focuses on the post-1980 decentralization activities that were 
partly introduced by liberal export-oriented growth strategies and partly demanded 
by cosmopolitan urban and local elites. The European Union (EU) accession pro-
cess, which has accelerated since the late 1990s, has also played a catalyzing role in 
shaping state and local authority and civil society relations. The most significant 
administrative decentralization was realized as a result of an increasing number 
of elected municipal authorities and their increased economic powers. However, 
municipalities controlled by opposition parties often ran into conflictual relations 
with the ruling parties and state-appointed governors. Personal and political antag-
onisms shaped by interest group politics consequently hampered local development 
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initiatives, and local business elites used political party connections to maximize 
personal and group gains to the detriment of their respective localities.
Three fundamental changes shaped decentralization to markets, civil society, 
and lower echelons of administrative units in the post-1980 period. First, economic 
liberalization was driven by both internal and external factors. Turkey followed 
monetary stabilization policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank to open up the previously closed economy. Trade liberalization 
introduced by the Motherland Party (ANAP) led to new competitive pressures for 
domestic conglomerates and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) under a 
regime of export-led growth. These policies aimed to reduce the role of the state in 
the economy, promote entrepreneurialism, and empower the new urban classes. 
The Turkish economy grew on average more than 5 percent annually from the mid-
1980s, despite the financial crises of 1994, 1999, and 2001. Previously underdevel-
oped sectors such as tourism, textiles, and ready-made garments emerged as engines 
of export growth. Sluggish privatization and foreign direct investment (FDI) efforts 
have also gained momentum since 2000. There has been a rapid growth in exports, 
from $13 billion in 1990 to almost $85 billion in 2006, which has also fuelled 
growth in domestic consumption.
The second trend has been the diffusion of industrialization to provincial Ana-
tolian towns, which are city centers in the Asian provinces of Turkey. The rapid 
urban growth associated with the emergence of new metropolitan towns diversified 
regional economies beyond the old urban centers of Izmir, Istanbul, and Ankara. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the city economies were gradually transformed by the 
growth of small- and medium-sized businesses that became integrated into regional 
and world markets. Modern capitalist establishments largely eliminated craftsmen 
and artisans, local business culture embraced free markets and globalization, and 
the agrarian and religious social character of these centers, as well as their entrepre-
neurs, helped to generate a new form of pious capitalism.2 The rise of political Islam 
contributed to the growth of new urban classes. These groups later shaped Islamist 
politics by demanding greater autonomy, political recognition, and power from the 
centralist forces: the Ankara-centered secular modernist state and the Istanbul-cen-
tered business holdings and cosmopolitan financial world. The ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) drew its main supporters from this second generation of 
urban bourgeoisie.3 Pious capitalists of Anatolia began to challenge the domination 
of Istanbul-based business conglomerates in the country’s economy as well as the 
top-down modernization of the secular bureaucracy in Ankara.4, ii
Third, administrative decentralization became an imperative as the country 
became more urban and industrial. Ankara-based state institutions were unable 
to cope with the increasing and diverse needs of an emerging urban Turkey. A 
new administrative culture was needed to improve service delivery and provide fair 
access to public services. These developments were accompanied by differentiated 
and more sophisticated expectations of social and business groups across the coun-
try. Moreover, recent demands for more democracy put forward by emerging civil 
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society organizations mark a new trend. Previous demands for decentralization 
came largely from academia, intellectuals, and mayors who were concerned with 
the rapidly growing cities of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. These early demands 
were not abstract imaginative arguments for decentralization in governance but 
were rather limited to solving tangible problems of metropolitan municipal govern-
ments. What we see after 1990, however, is a new trend toward containing the state 
and shifting power to local groups and municipalities.
Although slow and frustrating, Turkey’s accession process to the EU funda-
mentally affected state–society relations. Turkey has made impressive progress in 
addressing the Copenhagen Criteria for Accession—the EU norms and standards 
for democratic governance, human rights, a functioning market economy, and 
administrative efficiency—and has entered into long and complicated negotiations. 
The EU provided significant technical expertise to reach the Copenhagen Criteria, 
with a particular focus on democracy and the rule of law. EU reform packages 
and projects also introduced new standards and benchmarks for administrative 
reform.
To examine administrative reform in Turkey, this chapter is organized into 
four main sections. The first section examines social and political transformation 
in the post-1980 period. This will be followed by an analysis of industrialization 
in Anatolian towns and new urban elites. The third section introduces recent EU 
reforms and projects that are fundamentally changing public administration and 
state–society relations in Turkey. Finally, the conclusion highlights the main points 
presented in the chapter, questions the suitability of EU–Turkey relations, and 
assesses Turkey’s current positioning for further administrative reform.
2 Societal and Political Transformation Since 1980
The modern Turkish system of public administration was initially based on the 
principle of a strong central government presiding over weak localities. This form 
of governance was also a prerequisite for top-down secular modernization led by 
bureaucratic and military elites. Within this context, Turkish public administra-
tion is structured on three administrative layers: (1) the province and subprovince 
administration appointed by the central government, (2) elected municipal bodies, 
and (3) village administration.
Turkey is divided into 82 provinces, and there are no provisions for regional 
administrative units or authority. These 82 provincial organs are each headed by 
a governor who is appointed by the minister of the interior in cooperation with 
the provincial council (an elected body). Each province has townships as subunits, 
and these have both appointed deputy governors and elected mayors. Municipal 
governance is the true local democratic unit, and it includes an elected mayor and 
an elected municipal council. Village governance, like provincial governance, is 
comprised of a mixture of elected and nonelected members. It includes an elected 
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village “headman” and a village council, which has elected members, appointed 
members, and local representatives such as teachers and big landowners who are 
accepted as “natural” members.5
Until the 1980s, municipalities in Turkey had very limited powers. The first 
municipality law was passed in 1930, and it simply listed the duties and responsi-
bilities of local authorities. This law remained the major legal influence in munici-
pal governance until recently. This structure of limited autonomy made localities 
subservient to the republic, and, from urban planning to budgetary allocation, 
local governments remained dependent on political bodies and state institutions 
in Ankara. This structure of governance represents a form of administrative mod-
ernization that is commonly referred to as statist-centralist. From the 1950s, this 
statist-centralist structure became a proverbial straitjacket, constraining societal 
and economic change during a period of rapid increases in literacy, urbanization, 
and industrialization. It was all the more untenable when public opposition grew 
along with the emergence of radical trade union and student movements during 
the 1960s and 1970s. Such public opposition combined with subsequent diffused 
industrialization to undermine the influence of the so-called Republican elite, a 
powerful segment of Turkish society that defended the secular legacy of Turkey’s 
founding principles and whose members occupied key positions in the military, 
civil service, judiciary, and academia.
Rapid urbanization overburdened municipal administrations too wedded 
to archaic political and managerial practices. And political divisions deepened 
between appointed governors and elected bodies since fiscal controls remained in 
the hands of central state organs. As municipal authorities did not have the power 
to levy local taxes, they were chronically burdened by scarce resources to meet the 
growing needs of urban planning and management.
Thus, a managerial approach toward decentralization became the dominant 
trend of the 1980s. This trend was led by pragmatists of the neoliberal elite who 
opted for dismantling the state’s leading role in the economy by means of privati-
zation, reduced public spending on health and education, and export-promotion 
policies. Worldwide trends toward downsizing central government and increasing 
bureaucratic efficiency were reflected in the policies of international financial insti-
tutions and, therefore, had substantial political leverage in the post-1979 economic 
crisis of Turkey. The ruling ANAP party, led by Tugut Özal, who was an admirer of 
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, prepared the foundations of decentraliza-
tion from the state to the private sector and civil society, albeit with narrow political 
freedoms.
In 1984, the Greater Municipalities Act introduced a new concept of metropoli-
tan governance by redefining the roles and responsibilities of small municipalities 
and their districts, along with their relationships to the greater municipality. This 
marked an important step for decentralized and more independent local govern-
ments.6 The municipalities were also granted permission to develop urban plans 
along with the state-run bank for provincial development.iii As a result of these 
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efforts, many municipalities began initiating their own housing, transportation, 
water, and sewage treatment projects in the 1990s. For the first time, these munici-
palities were also able to borrow funds from international markets.
The private sector started to play a major role in urban development in the post-
1980 period as well. This trend was promoted by liberal policies, the expansion of 
municipal contracts, and procurement that generated new local opportunities for 
small and medium-sized businesses. Benefiting from the postcoup political vac-
uum, the ANAP introduced bold liberalization measures to replace import substi-
tution policies. The Istanbul business community, which had already put pressure 
on government during the late 1970s to liberalize the economy, warmly supported 
the ANAP’s new vision. Turkey’s first membership application to the European 
Community in 1987 fit in as a strategic move aimed at opening European markets 
for Turkish exporters. This paved the way for the 1995 Customs Union with the 
EU.
However, civil society activities had been discredited by radicalized left- and 
right-wing patronage networks in the 1970s and led to deep mistrust toward civic 
action in the public psyche. Many trade union and civil society organizations were 
closed down by military rule. The country also faced 15 years of war between mili-
tary forces and the separatist Kurdish organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK). During that period, those promoting economic liberalism were among the 
first to recognize the need for some degree of accompanying social and political 
liberalism. For example, the organization representing Istanbul-based large busi-
nesses, TUSIAD, emerged as a leading force defending human rights, Kurdish eth-
nic expressions, and democracy in Turkey.7 With the acceleration of preparations 
for EU accession and the cessation of hostilities with the PKK upon the capture 
of their leader, Turkish governments passed several reform packages to enhance 
human rights and individual freedoms.
Another trend toward decentralization gained momentum in the aftermath of 
Turgut Özal’s death in 1989 and the subsequent realignment of centrist politics, 
which led to a new political landscape from the March 1994 local elections. The 
Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) took power in the municipalities of Istanbul 
and Ankara, as well as many other smaller towns, including some predominantly 
Kurdish towns in southeastern Turkey. The Welfare Party was a recombination 
of the Islamist right-wing National Order Party (MNP) and the National Salva-
tion Party (MSP). Their success was based on their capacity to organize solidarity 
networks at the grassroots level in cities and develop a new Islamist, modernist 
political image. When the judicial system was used to close down the Welfare 
Party in 1998, the AKP was established by a group of reform-minded Islamists. The 
post-1980 liberalization made room for institutions that contributed to the growing 
strength of political Islam, while leftist and center-right politics fell into a series of 
ideological and leadership crises.
The increasing popularity of political Islam was accompanied by a growing 
rivalry between first- and second-generation business elites. This gave rise to a 
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successful Islamist business association (MUSIAD), which competed with TUSIAD 
for influence.8,9,10 Islamic politics in the 1990s were mainly supported with capi-
tal from provincial Anatolian towns and religious groups. As the economy grew, 
Islamist business owners also diversified their economic interests. Many small and 
medium-sized towns experienced industrial growth. One major social consequence 
of Anatolian industrialization was to bring capital accumulation into the hands of 
provincial businessmen. This capital accumulation and new prosperity reversed an 
economic decline that had begun in the late Ottoman Empire.11
In the 1990s, Turkey was ruled by shaky coalition governments. At the same 
time, deepening economic liberalization and democratization brought forth eth-
nic and religious expressions of diversity and demands for pluralism. Turkey–EU 
relations influenced the domestic power struggle between mainstream parties and 
political newcomers. This was a special concern of Tansu Çiller, the center-right 
prime minister at the time when the Customs Union with the EU was agreed, who 
frequently stressed that the isolation of Turkey from Europe would lead to the rise 
of fundamentalism. Ironically, it was she who established the coalition government 
of 1996 with the Islamist Welfare Party.
The most recent decentralization trend emerged in conjunction with the AKP’s 
success in the 2002 elections. Without questioning the basis of their predecessors’ 
fiscal policies, the AKP government continued to implement macroeconomic sta-
bility and financial responsibility practices that were part of the IMF stability pro-
gram first introduced by the Ecevit government following the 2001 banking and 
financial sector crisis. They also increased the powers and resources of local govern-
ments and passed several EU reform packages through parliament. Local govern-
ment reform gained further momentum in 2005, when the parliament adopted 
new legislative reforms aiming to restructure systems of governance, enhance effi-
ciency, increase democratic participation, and ensure accountability.
3 Anatolian Tigers and Islamic Capitalism
Without the emergence of Anatolian industrial and urban centers, Turkey could 
not have experienced administrative decentralization. As the country became pre-
dominantly urban (70 percent), the pressure from the geographical periphery to 
central government calling for better governance culminated in a vigorous new 
political voice. In 1929, there were 467 elected local authorities in municipalities. 
This number rose to 546 in 1947, then to more than 1,700 in 1977, and is currently 
more than 3,200. From the management of school boards and professional asso-
ciations to environmental pressure groups, Turkish society began organizing and 
influencing its local governments.12
The main change came with increasing industrialization in the provincial 
towns of Anatolia and the rise of new urban classes with strong traditional rural 
values.iv Members of these new groups held a certain resentment toward top-down 
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modernization characterized by secularism, cosmopolitanism, and an elitist state 
bureaucracy. Liberal government policies contributed to economic development 
by encouraging entrepreneurial activities, loosening the control of the state, and 
diversifying social class structures in urban areas. Indigenous SMEs with strong 
rural links sustained the local economies of many Anatolian towns, which, in con-
junction with the rise of political Islam, contributed to and exploited small town 
development. Consequently, the left and liberal right parties lost the management 
of metropolitan cities for the first time in the 1994 local elections. Three growing 
industrial centers, Denizli, Gaziantep, and Kayseri, exemplify these deep changes 
taking place in Anatolia. Economic development in these towns began with mod-
ernization in agriculture, which started in the 1950s. Surplus value was transferred 
from rural to urban areas, contributing to capital accumulation for industry and 
commerce. This process also increased the rural demand for agricultural machinery 
and domestic goods. During the first push, many skills were developed through 
small manufacturing workshops in all three cities.13
The second push came with urbanization. Increasing urban demand coupled 
with weak competition in the closed economy of the 1960s and 1970s offered new 
opportunities for local SMEs. Urbanization offered cheap young labor for new busi-
nesses. During the 1970s all three cities suffered losses because of the emigration 
of skilled workers to Western Europe, mainly to Germany. But the city economies 
also benefited from the remittances of Turkish workers abroad. The gradual integra-
tion of economic activities emerged through the national distribution and franchis-
ing networks of large companies that also diffused new ideas, goods, and business 
practices to small and medium-sized towns. The state also played a crucial role as 
facilitator in the industrialization process of many Anatolian towns. The state sup-
ported market decentralization by financing urban infrastructure and delivering 
opportunities through state procurements and tax and export incentives.
The third push came with the liberal policies of the 1980s and the gradual 
opening of the Turkish economy to world markets. During the 1980s, export busi-
nesses focused on Arab and other Middle Eastern markets. With the fall in oil 
prices and increasing confidence, many businesses entered new markets in Europe, 
Russia, and Central Asia. Through increased trade and manufacturing opportuni-
ties, previously inward-looking SMEs had a chance to benefit from export-oriented 
growth. This process, in return, changed the character of the local SMEs from 
being inward looking and conservative to being adventurous and risk taking. There 
also emerged a gradual diffusion of various industries into smaller rural towns. For 
instance, the towns of Babadağ and Buldan in Denizli and Hacılar in Kayseri are 
now strong manufacturing locations as well as agricultural centers. They provide 
some evidence that these developments are the beginning of extensive industrial 
diffusion into provincial lands.
These developments came along with the emergence of new Anatolian busi-
ness and urban classes firmly rooted in Islamic traditions and indigenous local cul-
tures. Sometimes in opposition to the secular urban elite and state ideology but also 
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firmly attached to republican patriotism, these groups sought to assert their power 
through center-right party politics and fed the growth of Islamist parties. Munici-
palities controlled by the Islamists began forming their own development initia-
tives along with local businesses. One such town, Kayseri, has been the bastion of 
Islamic politics in Turkey. As one of the largest rapidly industrialized Anatolian 
cities, Kayseri illustrates an indigenous form of conservatism. By embracing Islam 
but not forgetting the virtues of profit making, its businessmen became symbols of 
a new breed of entrepreneurs, neither marginalized artisans nor cosmopolitan con-
glomerates but outward-looking pious capitalists.14 In 2005, Kayseri’s new indus-
trial zone celebrated the opening of 139 new factories in one single day. A similar 
launch took place in 2006 for more than 100 companies.
The European Stability Initiative (ESI), a German think tank, celebrated Kay-
seri and popularized the term Islamic Calvinists to describe its businessmen. This 
term was first used by the former mayor of Kayseri, Mr. Şükrü Karatepe, who 
argued that one must read Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
to understand his city.15 In their study of Islamic companies, Özcan and Çokgezen16 
similarly pointed out that although Islamic values are employed as a social glue for 
interpersonal trust, Muslims are as capitalist and motivated by self-interest as oth-
ers. Hard work and money-making relations embraced by pious values emerged 
along with the deepening liberalization and capitalist market relations, and social 
norms adapted themselves for a new form of moral capitalism. The theme of the 
ESI study is that conservative religious values are a force for progress in develop-
ment, but those values are not necessarily Christian or European. However, attrib-
uting economic success to religion is not as fruitful as it is attractive. Sociological 
perspectives do not explain under what circumstances restraining old norms turns 
into flourishing business practices. For example, many people associate Confucian 
values with the recent Chinese economic success, but they fail to explain why and 
how these same values accommodated decades of poverty and one-party brutality 
in China.
4 EU-Induced Administrative Reforms
Turkey’s recent local governance and public management reforms have been under-
pinned by structural transformation initiated by governments and external actors, 
including the EU, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). For decades, 
state institutions have been resistant to change, and the governments have been 
reluctant to draw on external advice and assistance for the reform of administrative 
systems. Although decentralization to local government has been a particularly 
sensitive area because of the strong tradition of unitary and centralized governance, 
dramatic changes have taken place in recent years. Many of these structural reforms 
were introduced as part of the accelerated process of EU accession. The current 
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Turkish government recognized the need for reform and the benefits of partnering 
with external agencies to modernize Turkey’s state structures and to comply with 
the requirements of the EU. Virtually all of the EU assistance programs now require 
the channeling of financial assistance through regional and local administrations.
As the 2001 EU White Paper on governance suggests, European governance 
actually denotes a complete recontextualization of politics and the transformation 
of political structures.17 Along with increasing denationalization, there has been a 
shift of power from the nation-state to supranational institutions. This new form 
of governance aims to integrate EU member states to the European institutional 
scheme by reshaping their territorial structures, empowering local governments, 
and mobilizing social and political movements. Although this process shows sig-
nificant variation among the EU member states, economically peripheral states of 
South and Eastern Europe have shown greater enthusiasm for the EU’s suprana-
tional powers to push for domestic reforms. Turkey has been going through this 
process with dramatic new changes.
Strong and effective public administration reforms to improve administrative 
capacity in line with EU accession principles were accelerated by the AKP govern-
ment in three reform packages, namely, the Project to Restructure Public Manage-
ment, the Immediate Action Plan for the Government, and the Draft Framework 
Bill on Public Administration. The government also prepared a plan for compre-
hensive administrative reform by drafting a series of legal changes including the 
Public Administration Draft Law, the Law on Metropolitan Areas, the Law on 
Municipalities, and the Draft Law on Special Provincial Administrations. These 
reforms affirmed the continuing decentralization process. Although they primarily 
aimed to strengthen local authorities, these laws also intended to modernize public 
finance management, redefine the role and structure of coordinating bodies, regu-
late working and communication procedures, and enhance administrative capacity 
and efficiency through enhanced information systems.18
The Decentralised Implementation System (DIS) has been one of the key 
reforms in this field. The aim of the DIS is to provide an appropriate legal and 
administrative framework for the transfer of responsibilities for the implementa-
tion of the EU-funded programs from the European Commission (EC) to partner 
countries.19 In recent years, the EU has been giving more responsibility to institu-
tions in the partner countries, and this began to change the practice of top- down 
central administrative management in Turkey. For the introduction of the DIS in 
Turkey, a financial cooperation agreement was issued on 18 July 2001. This aimed 
to design the management of various administrative functions in a decentralized 
system according to the framework of the preaccession strategy.
Turkey is also in close partnership with OECD/SIGMA (Support for the 
Improvement of Governance in Management of the Administration) in concert 
with public administration reform efforts and the EU accession process.20 For 
example, in 2004, the EC requested SIGMA, a joint initiative of the OECD and 
the EU, to assess the state of central systems in Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. 
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The SIGMA program supports partner countries in their efforts to modernize pub-
lic governance systems. It assesses reform progress and identifies priorities; it also 
assists in the process of institution building by helping to design and implement 
action plans. The SIGMA program was made available to Turkey upon the agree-
ment of a new contract between the OECD and the EC on 8 May 2004. The first 
task set by the EC was to conduct assessments on aspects of Turkey’s administra-
tive performance. And at the request of the Prime Ministry of Turkey in Febru-
ary 2005, SIGMA organized in Ankara a seminar titled “Public Administration 
Reform and European Integration.” The main purpose of the event was to stimu-
late a debate among officials of the central government on the needs and goals for 
reforming public administration in Turkey. It also aimed to raise awareness of the 
principles of governing in the European administrative space and the implications 
of EU membership for administration. SIGMA has cooperated on three major sub-
jects with the Prime Ministry and Secretariat General for EU affairs: The Civil and 
Administrative Framework, Public Procurement, and An Integrity Framework.
In the context of Turkey’s EU preaccession process, an auxiliary project, the Local 
Administration Reform Programme, was agreed between the EC and Turkish gov-
ernment in 2003. The overall objective of the Local Administration Reform Pro-
gramme is to (1) strengthen the capacity of both central and local administrations 
to formulate and implement reform policies and initiatives, (2) improve budget-
ary procedures and service performance in selected pilot administrations, and (3) 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of human resources. This project envisaged 
new changes in the way local administration affairs are conducted and managed by 
the Interior Ministry. The project started in August 2005 and lasted until November 
2007. The project is being implemented by the Ministry of Interior (General Directorate 
for Local Authorities), with technical assistance provided by the UNDP and funding 
provided by the EC’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership program (MEDA). The Local 
Administration Reform Programme was launched through the adoption of new 
legislation on local authorities, and it encompasses a wide number of reforms that 
affect all aspects of local administration and management. The final purpose of 
the Local Administration Reform Programme is to enable local authorities to pro-
vide better public services, carry out more efficient management of their financial 
resources, and enhance their capacity for more active engagement in policy making 
with national authorities and in creating partnerships with other local authorities in 
EU member countries.21
Another project conducted to promote decentralized, participatory, and trans-
parent governance in Turkey is the International Public Cooperation Programme 
(MATRA) supported by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the par-
ticipation of the International Co-operation Agency of the Association of Nether-
lands Municipalities (VNG International), the Turkish Economic and Social Studies 
Foundation (TESEV), and the International Union of Local Authorities Section for 
the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East Region (IULA-EMME), MATRA aims 
to institutionalize good governance practices by focusing on institution building 
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and capacity building for governmental organizations in Turkey, particularly in the 
municipalities in South and Southeast Anatolia.22
The Local Agenda 21 (LA 21) program was initiated by UNDP for the 
promotion of good governance and local democracy. The program draws on the 
UNDP’s links with global environmental initiatives and was generated as a direct 
result of the participation of Turkey’s central government and local mayors in 
HABITAT II, the major environmental UN summit, which was held in Turkey in 
1996. The UNDP adopted a successful catalytic approach, which relied extensively 
on national technical inputs and capacity in the early stages of program design and 
implementation. The main element of the LA 21 program entails the establishment 
of city councils, which are city-level participatory mechanisms for decision making. 
These councils then bring together community-based organizations, NGOs, labor 
unions, academics, the private sector, individual citizens, and local governments 
into a consultative forum that raises and discusses issues of direct concern to the 
participating communities.
In Turkey, the LA 21 program is nationally executed by the International 
Union of Local Authorities Section for the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle 
East Region, which is based in Istanbul. LA 21 exemplifies Turkey’s ability to lever-
age its own limited resources and has far wider implications than the management 
of environmental assets alone. Indeed, this program has helped to increase signifi-
cantly the level of participation of civil society organizations and private citizens in 
decision making and also increased the level of decentralization of governance in 
Turkey. At the broadest level, the UNDP LA 21 program has spread, largely spon-
taneously and through local initiatives, a locally adapted model of City Councils 
from nine pilot municipalities to more than 50 cities throughout the country.
Another major step in administrative reform is the recent decision to set up 
regional development agencies under the State Planning Organisation (DPT). The 
DPT has been preparing five-year development plans since the 1960s and initi-
ated regional development programs across the country. However, these projects 
were sporadic and never fully integrated into local decision making and civil soci-
ety. Instead, planning remained a top-down exercise by a group of Ankara-based 
bureaucratic and intellectual elite. Planning in general, and regional planning in 
particular, were condemned as leftist communist ideologies by the ruling center-
right parties for decades. And to a certain extent, the DPT’s plans did portray such 
characteristics with their poor links to markets and social realities. The nature of 
the DPT’s operations and plans began to change, however, with the South East-
ern Anatolian Development Project (GAP), which was comprised of more than 30 
dams and irrigation canals that united seven cities. As a result of GAP, there have 
been concerted efforts toward community-based initiatives and local participation, 
and regional development initiatives have also been proliferating with unusual 
speed and variety.24
In 2000 the Eastern Black Sea Development Agency (DAP) was initiated with 
the support of the Japanese International Development Agency (JICA). The same 
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year, the Eastern Anatolian Development project (DOKAP) and the Bartin–Zon-
guldak–Karabuk development initiatives were launched with a new concept of 
partnership and cooperation between the DPT and five universities in the region. 
The DPT developed a variety of programs and new regional subunits to aid regional 
development and Turkish Research Areas (TRAs) for EU projects.25 Differentia-
tion in national development priorities and detailed plans were developed by the 
DPT for the purpose of EU funding, and the statistical regional units of TRAs 
were established in line with the EU programs. The DPT continued producing 
national plans but with a more specific focus on regional development issues rather 
than on sectoral targets.
Although Turkey has been the beneficiary of an impressive array of EU-funded 
administrative restructuring projects, they are not nearly sufficient for Turkey to 
upgrade its administrative capacity to EU levels of performance and operability. 
Turkey has not gone through a new organizational and bureaucratic transforma-
tion, and EU-inspired reforms have not produced new institutions for policy imple-
mentation. The EU’s technical and financial assistance to Turkey has long been 
subjected to the Greek governments’ vetov and has never had a significant impact at 
the operational level. Moreover, EU–Turkey relations were recently strained because 
of Turkey’s refusal to extend the Customs Union agreement to Greek Cypriots as 
long as Turkish Cyprus remains isolated.vi Contrary to its earlier promise to lift 
the trade embargo on the Turkish side, the EU subsequently diminished the scope 
and nature of its earlier promises. Following the crisis concerning Cyprus and the 
increasingly negative atmosphere toward Turkish membership among several EU 
states, the EC slowed down membership talks with Turkey, and many negotiation 
chapters are currently frozen.
Nine packages of constitutional and legal reforms have been promulgated to 
widen minority rights, curb corruption, strengthen civilian authority over the mili-
tary, and abolish the death penalty and security courts. The EC, which is moni-
toring the implementation of these extensive changes, has noted that the relative 
inexperience of the judiciary and bureaucracy is constraining compliance with EU-
induced reforms. But more importantly, the EU’s questioning tone toward Turkey 
and its preferential treatment toward Cyprus and other Balkan states have damaged 
Turkey–EU relations for a long time to come. As a result of growing assertiveness 
in the xenophobic tone of the EU member states that oppose Turkish membership, 
Turkey has assumed a more suspicious, defensive, and nationalistic posture in rela-
tion to Europe. Consequently, a form of staunch nationalism has been recently 
increasing in Turkey, in part as a backlash of current EU–Turkey relations and 
partly as a response to the worsening situation in neighboring Iraq and growing 
suspicion of U.S. policies in the Middle East.
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5 Conclusion
Two primary forces have fuelled Turkey’s decentralization in the social and politi-
cal spheres: (1) industrialization of the Anatolian towns through an extended role 
for SMEs and (2) the emergence of new urban classes. First, the diffusion of indus-
trialization to provincial Anatolian towns and the rapid urban growth associated 
with the emergence of new metropolitan towns combined to produce profound 
effects as city economies gradually transformed with SMEs integrated into regional 
and world markets, and modern capitalist establishments largely eliminated the 
craftsmen and artisans who had previously dominated city economies. Second, this 
transformation process resulted in the emergence of new urban middle classes and 
capitalist practices with influences from both local traditions and Islam.26 Societal 
changes, fast urban growth, and economic liberalization combined and created 
conditions for strong societal demands to contain the state and to decentralize and 
localize governance. The success of the ruling AKP is a result of this trend toward 
a new regime for further religious autonomy and increased political and economic 
power by emerging classes. For the most part, the party leadership played a mod-
erating role between strong local interests and long-established, top-down, secular, 
elite traditions.
The balanced approach utilized by Turkey’s AKP leadership facilitated the EU’s 
becoming a legitimizing force for political and administrative reform. The EU has 
affected not only formal structures, such as Turkey’s national legal system and 
national and regional administrations, but also business–government relations and 
wider societal expectations concerning law, human rights, and public order.27 How-
ever, the impacts of reform are not even across regions and social groups. Because 
of social and economic inequalities, larger cities and wealthier classes benefit from 
changes rather quickly, while rural populations and the southeastern regions, espe-
cially those that suffered from the war between the PKK and the army throughout 
the 1990s, have weak civil society structures and are slow to absorb change.
There are also ongoing deep fractures concerning the EU’s sincerity toward 
Turkey. Turkish membership has recently become subjected to individual mem-
ber state’s domestic political dynamics and the calculations of political leaders, 
most notably observed during Turkey’s presidential elections by Nicolas Sarkozy 
in France and Angela Merkel in Germany. Both repeatedly stressed that Turkey 
is not European enough and is culturally different (with regard to religion) and 
should therefore be offered a status of privileged partnership—rather than member-
ship—in the EU. Despite these odds, the process of reform has gained unstoppable 
momentum in Turkey. Efforts toward reform have raised public expectations to a 
level that any government or political movement pondering a reversal would now 
fail to secure popular support. However, an important distinction is also emerg-
ing: Turkey’s long ambition of internalizing Westernization and civilization is no 
longer narrowly interpreted as and associated with Europeanization. This public 
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perception is likely to shape a new but somewhat cautious relationship with the EU, 
and its calls for administrative decentralization.
Finally, following inconclusive presidential elections in May 2007, the balanced 
policy of the ruling AKP government was upended when a deepening conflict 
emerged between it and the secular establishment (the president, army, and civil 
society groups). At this point in time, further deepening of decentralization that 
will enhance local democratic institutions requires strong political consensus on 
the principles of the constitutional existence of the state. This process must urgently 
address three fundamental domains: (1) the relationship between religion and state, 
(2) a wide range of political reforms to contain ethnic separatism, and (3) a con-
certed civilian effort to overtake the army’s central role in politics. The public debate 
on to what extent secularism can accommodate political Islam within democracy 
has been deepening in recent months, but party politics have been polarized and 
ineffectual in reaching consensus on a constitutional position on the issue. Despite 
EU-influenced reforms, Kurdish political parties still live in the shadow of the 
PKK’s terror tactics. The Turkish army has resisted giving up its central position 
and instead continues to meddle in domestic politics. Turkey now needs another 
change of direction in its domestic political and economic management, and it is 
essential that such change be accomplished through civilian means. Decisions con-
cerning the nature of Turkey’s future political and economic environments will, of 
course, determine the nature of future administrative reform in Turkey.
Notes
 i. There is a compulsory military service for 18 months in Turkey, thus the army, as one 
of the strongest institutions in the country, is not clearly detached from the society 
like in the case of professional armies. Many claim that there is a strong bonding 
between ordinary citizens and Turkish army.
 ii. Although Turkey’s largest businesses are still owned by foreign- and state-owned com-
panies as well as by Istanbul-based family conglomerates, the number of successful Ana-
tolian businesses has also been increasing. According to the 2005 Istanbul Chamber of 
Commerce classification, 23 Anatolian businesses, mostly SMEs, managed to get in the 
top 50 of the second league of largest companies. For additional details, see media reports 
at http://www.aktifhaber.com/read_news.php?nID=80711.
 iii. Iller Bankası is a state-owned development and investment bank dealing with munic-
ipalities and councils.
 iv. The rise of political Islam in Turkey is due to a complex set of developments, not 
just a consequence of the rise of Anatolian SMEs. However, because this chapter is 
mainly addressing political Islam within the context of decentralization and rising 
new urban classes, a more detailed focus on and explanation for the rise of political 
Islam are beyond the scope of this chapter.
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 v. Greece joined the EU in 1981 and systematically used its veto right to block EU’s 
technical and financial help to Turkey. The division of Cyprus between Turkish north 
and Greek south more recently intensified the tension between Turkey and the EU, as 
the Greek section of the island became a member of the EU in 2005 despite its rejec-
tion of the UN-backed unification plan. Turks believe that Greek veto is being used 
by EU’s big Turcophobes such as France, Germany, and Austria as a tool to block 
Turkish membership in medium term.
 vi. Following its independence from Britain in 1960, Cyprus was a bicommunal—Greek 
and Turkish—republic. However, there had been violent tensions between the two 
communities during the late 1960s. In 1974, the military government in Greece 
backed a right-wing coup to topple the Cyprus government and unite the island with 
Greece. In response, Turkey invaded northern Cyprus and created an ethnic enclave 
for Turkish Cypriots in the north. The southern regime remained as the internation-
ally recognized Cypriot regime, whereas the north stayed isolated and dependent on 
Turkey. The last attempt to unify the island drafted by the UN and supported by the 
EU was accepted by the Turkish side but rejected by Greek Cypriots in 2005.
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